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ABSTRACT. – We develop a model of Cournot oligopolists with en-
dogenous R&D spillovers where a speci…c type of co-opetition is introduced.
The two principle factors of R§D spillovers, namely the absorptive capacity
and the information-sharing parameter, are assumed to depend positively on
the percentage ofknowledge the …rm chooses to codify and reveal. It is shown
that identical …rms that are rivals on the …nal good market do not necessa-
rily choose the lowest level for the spillover parameters. Furthermore, there
is some justi…cation for a subsidy to knowledge codi…cation and information-
sharing. However, the latter is obtained under conditions on …rms’ tech-
nologies and spillover functions which ensure the emergence of symmetric
solutions.
Keywords : cost reduction, endogenous spillovers, information sharing,
absorptive capacity, co-opetition.
JEL Classi…cation Numbers : D43, D62, D83, L13.
¤I would like to thank Rabah Amir, Antoine Bureth, Patrick Cohendet, and one anony-
mous referee as well as seminar participants at BETA, University of Strasbourg, for their
comments and suggestions. The usual caveat applies.
11 Introduction
In this paper we develop a model of Cournot oligopolists with endogenous
R&D spillovers. Strategic cost reduction R&D with spillover e¤ects has been
studied intensively in the literature of industrial organization. Most early
papers (see Kamien, M, E. Muller and I. Zang (1992), Katz (1986), d’As-
premont et Jacquemin (1988), Crépon et al. (1992), Motta (1992), Beath,
Poyago-Theotoky and Ulph (1998) among others1) assume that …rms have
no control over the spillover coe¢cient and do not have to pay for learning
from rivals. However, according to Mans…eld et al. (1981) imitation costs can
be substantial. Hence, the e¤ectiveness of learning is a function ofinvestment
and a deliberate learning e¤ort. In other words spillovers are endogenous ra-
ther than exogenous.
Spillovers are usually thought to arise through one …rm’s acquisition of
informationabout the researchdiscoveries of another …rm. Twomajor factors
bear on the extent of this spillover : the amount of information shared by
the source …rm of externality and the usefulness of that information for the
acquiring …rm. We shall refer to the …rst factor as the information-sharing
spillover (which is the fraction of information that the …rm passes to other
…rms) and to the second one as the …rm’s absorptive capacity2, namely the
fraction of the information about others’ research discoveries that the …rm is
able to exploit.
The major contribution of this paper is to construct a model where these
two spillover variables are dependent. The motivation is the following. In
many cases, once a …rm has undertaken R&D expenditure and made a disco-
very, the more it decides to share its knowledge the more it is able to absorb
informationabout the researchdiscoveries ofother …rms. Tobemore explicit,
assume that there exists a code which allows …rms to share their knowledge.
As an example, consider the code to be “writing patents”. By using this code
the …rm shares not only more information but also develops skills to read the
code better : A …rm is more able to read a patent written by its competi-
tors as it becomes itself an expert in writing patents. In order to take into
account this codi…cation/information process, it seems important to study
what happens when, for exogenous R&D expenditure, the two spillover pa-
rameters endogenously depend on one single strategic variable, the share of
knowledge which is codi…ed for information sharing. We refer to this as the
share ofcodi…ed knowledge. It is assumed to increase the information-sharing
spillover but also the …rm’s absorptive capacity.
1See de Bondt (1996) for a survey.
2This terminology was introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1989).
2Due to this double impact of knowledge codi…cation, this paper treats
with a speci…c type of co-opetition, where despite …rms are rivals in the
…nal good market they choose to cooperate at some level. The notion of
co-opetition3 was expanded by Nalebu¤ and Brandenburger (1996). These
authors develop the theme that …rms may modify the rules of their games
in order to achieve partial cooperation, while remaining rivals in the …nal
good market. This notion has also been formalized by Long and Soubeyran
(2001) in anasymmetric4 oligopoly. These authors consider a two-stage game
where rival …rms in the …nal good market manipulate cooperatively their
marginal costs in stage one. Here, whether …rms choose cooperatively or not
their share of codi…ed knowledge in order to manipulate their marginal costs,
cooperation takes place in the sense that when …rms codify their knowledge
they share information with others. In the sequel, we refer to the game where
…rms collude in stage one in order to maximize industry pro…t as the “pure”
co-opetition game. While we refer to the game where strategic variables are
chosen non cooperatively at all stages as the non-collusive game.
This paper isalsorelatedto arangeof recent papers onendogenous spillo-
vers. However in the literature the two spillover variables are independently
chosen and therefore the speci…c type of co-opetition mentioned above is not
considered. For some authors, …rms can alternately control either of the two
spillover variables as, for example, Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998a), Amir and
Wooders (1999, 2000). Others focus on the ability of …rms to control the
information-sharing parameter, see, for example, De Fraja (1993), Poyago-
Theotoky (1999), Kultti and Takalo (1998), Takalo (1998) and Katsoulacos
and Ulph (1998b). Others focus on the ability of …rms to control their ab-
sorptive capacity, see, for example, Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Kamien and
Zang (2000), Kanniainen and Stenbacka(2000). Morerecently JinandTroege
(2002) present a model where …rms choose simultaneously the two spillover
variables. Nevertheless, the two variables remain independent.
The initial purpose of this paper is to show that, in contrast to this
recent literature, non-collusive …rms operating in the same industry do not
necessarily choose the lowest level for the spillover parameters. The intuition
behind this result is related to the speci…c type of co-opetition introduced
in our model. Initially, the …rm has an incentive to keep its share of codi…ed
knowledge low, since …rms are rivals in the product market, an increase of
the information-sharing spillover parameter makes competition …ercer by de-
creasing the unit costs of its competitors. However, when the …rm increases
3This terminology is due to Ray Noorda quoted in Electronic Business Buyer, december
1993.
4Their general framework allows for both ex-ante and ex-post asymmetries.
3its share of codi…ed knowledge it also develops its skills to read the code bet-
ter, hence it increases its absorptive capacity of others’ research discoveries
and by the way its pro…t. The relative strength of these two marginal e¤ects
depends on two factors.
The …rst one is the strength of the rivalry e¤ect induced by a uniform
decrease in unit cost across …rms. Note that this e¤ect is related to the pos-
sibility of pro…t shifting discussed by Seade (1985).5 E¤ectively, the increase
of the share of codi…ed knowledge of one …rm decreases the unit cost of all
…rms. Seade (1985) shows that in the case of an oligopoly with identical
…rms and constant unit cost, a uniform decrease in unit cost across …rms will
rise the industry pro…t only if the demand curve is not too concave. At the
symmetric equilibrium, this allows to increase the pro…t of any …rm. Hence
Seade’s condition ensures a low rivalry e¤ect and a positive impact of the
uniform cost reduction on the pro…t of any …rm.
Independently of the cost of codi…cation, this …rst factor is the only one
to operate as long as, as assumed in most of the literature, the increase of the
strategic variable of one …rm generates a uniform decrease in unit cost across
…rms. However, in this paper, despite …rms are identical the increase of the
share of codi…ed knowledge of one …rm generates an asymmetric decrease in
unit cost across …rms. Hence, a second factor operates, namely the di¤erence
between the marginal decrease of the unit cost of the …rm and the marginal
decrease of the unit cost of any of its competitor.
We prove that the global e¤ect on the pro…t of any …rm is positive if
the demand curve is not too concave (our condition being less restrictive
than Seade’s condition) and if the elasticity of the absorptive capacity is
su¢ciently high with respect to the elasticity of the information-sharing
function.
The second important motivation for studying a model with endogenous
spillovers is to provide a framework for examining technology policies that
take the form, for example, of subsidies to information-sharing research joint
ventures – a type of policy that is particularly common in the European
Commission. In order to examine the rationale for such a policy we limit our
study to the linear demand case.
In a …rst step, we consider the pure co-opetition game where in stage
one …rms choose cooperatively their shares of codi…ed knowledge in order
to maximize industry pro…t while they remain rivals in stage two. We show
that, when the marginal cost of codi…cation/information-sharing is zero6,
5For a discussion of the central role of this phenomenon in co-opetiton games see also
Long and Soubeyran (1997).
6In that case the “cost of manipulating costs” (see Long and Soubeyran, 2001) is zero.
4due to the internalization of the positive R§D spillovers industry pro…t is
maximized at any symmetric solution when …rms codify the maximum le-
vel of their knowledge. This remains true as long as the marginal cost of
codi…cation/information-sharing is not too large. When this marginal cost is
low, we prove also that even when the solution of the pure co-opetition game
is not to codify all their knowledge, …rms choose to codify more than at the
non-collusive equilibrium. However, this last result crucially depends on the
assumptions made on …rms’ technology (more speci…cally onthe concavity of
the cost reductionfunction and the convexity ofthecodi…cation/information-
sharing cost function) and on the shape of the absorptive capacity and of the
information-sharing function that ensure the emergence of symmetric solu-
tions.
Furthermore, since the reduction of the sum of …rms’ unit costs allows
to increase the industry output and by the way the consumers’ surplus, this
symmetric solution with maximal spillovers parameters is socially optimal. In
addition, whatever the marginal cost of codi…cation/information-sharing, at
the non collusive symmetric interior equilibrium, it is always socially optimal
that …rms increase their share of codi…ed knowledge. Hence, there is some
justi…cation for a subsidy to codi…cation and information-sharing. Again,
this result is conditional on restrictions ensuring the emergence of symmetric
solutions.
In the last section, we prove that the welfare bene…ts of a collusive beha-
vior in stage one is reversed with distinct assumptions on …rms’ technology
when the collusive behavior is restricted to semi-collusion. Let us recall that
over the last ten years there has been a considerable interest in the role of
cooperation to overcome some of the market failures associated with R&D
and innovation (see, for example, Katz (1986), d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988), Crépon et al. (1992), Motta (1992), Beath, Poyago-Theotoky and
Ulph (1998)). However, virtually all this literature treats the R&D spillo-
vers as exogenous. For example, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) assume
that the same spillover parameter applies with and without cooperation.
WhileMotta(1992), Crépon et al. (1992), Beath, Poyago-Theotoky and Ulph
(1998)) assume that when …rms cooperate they achieve full information-
sharing and maximal absorptive capacity. The shortcoming of this forma-
lization is that one cannot distinguish between cooperation and maximal
information-sharing/absorptive capacity. Hence, we introduce the possibility
that a subset of …rms chooses cooperatively their shares of codi…ed know-
ledge which are not necessarily set at their highest level. Semi-collusion also
takes the form of an ex-ante increase in the spillover coe¢cients. This type of
semi-collusion has been developed by Fershtman and Gandal (1994), Fried-
mann and Thisse (1993), Long and Soubeyran (1998). We show that for a
5linear relationship between cost reduction andthe spillover parameters, semi-
collusion involves full information-sharing and maximal absorptive capacity.
However, this result is very sensitive to the speci…cation of the cost reduction
function.
Thestructureofthepaperisas follows: inSection 2weset thegenericmo-
del up and we characterize the non-collusive equilibrium in the most general
framework. In Section 3 the non-collusive symmetric equilibrium is characte-
rized in the linear demand case. More precisely, we specify theconditions that
give the non-collusive …rms the incentives to choose alternately the maximal,
an intermediary and the lowest share of codi…ed knowledge. The welfare re-
sult is established in Section 4. Finally, the possibility of semi-collusion and
emergence of an asymmetric equilibrium is introduced in Section 5.
2 The model
In this section, we consider a two-stage game between n identical rival
…rms. In stage one, they choose their share of codi…ed knowledge, which in-
‡uences the extent of their mutual information-sharing/absorptive capacity
parameters and therefore their cost structure. In the second stage, they com-
pete in quantities. Note that, in order to focus on the incentives …rms have
to share information and increase their absorptive capacity, we assume that
…rms have already made a symmetric choice of R§D expenditure.
We consider the subgame perfect equilibria of this game. These equili-
bria are to be determined through backward induction. Let us solve for the
equilibrium of the second stage, for any given cost structure. Note that this
analysis is valid regardless of the speci…c formulation of the problem in stage
one.
2.1 Analysis of Cournot Equilibrium in Stage Two
The inverse demand function is P = P (Q) satisfying
P
0(Q) < 0 and P (0) = ¹ P > 0
where Q =
Pn
j=1qj and qj denotes …rm j’s output:
Let µj denote…rm j’s unit cost ofproductionandxj its R&Dexpenditure.
In stage two µj is independent of …rm j’s current output but it is dependent
on the level of the percentage dk of …rm k’s knowledge which is codi…ed in
stage one, for k = 1;::: ;n. We assume that for each j thelevel µj is restricted
in the range [µmin;µmax]. The unit cost of this codi…cation and information-
sharing is c ¸ 0: As an illustration, let us consider that the code is “writing
6patents”. In this case, the marginal cost of codi…cation and information-
sharing is mainly the wage which is e¤ectively constant when the …rm is
price-taker on the labor market. Firm j’s pro…t is
¼j = [P (Q) ¡ µj]qj ¡cdjxj:
Firm j knows the value ofall unit costs of productionµj withj = 1;::: ;n
and takes qk with k 6= j as given. It chooses q¤
j to maximize pro…ts. The …rst-
order condition for an interior maximum, i.e such that q¤





j + P (Q
¤) = µj; (1)
where the star indicates equilibrium values. A su¢cient condition for (1) to
describe a solution is : P00 (Q¤)q¤
j + 2P0 (Q¤) ￿ 0. This condition may be
expressed as
2¡ sj"(Q¤) ¸ 0 (2)
where "(Q¤) = ¡
P 00(Q¤)Q¤




Q¤ is …rm j’s market share:
Assumption 1 The second order condition (2) is satis…ed.
We will consider only situations where all …rms produce in equilibrium
and there exists a unique Cournot equilibrium. Su¢cient conditions for the
existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibria are given by Kolstad and
Mathiesen (1987), Gaudet and Salant (1991). Summing (1) over the n …rms
one obtains
P0 (Q¤)Q¤+ nP (Q¤) =
n X
j=1
µj ´ µ (3)
where µ is the sum of the unit costs. Note that µ is restricted in the range
[nµmin;nµmax]. As pointed out by Bergstrom and Varian (1985), Equation (3)
shows that equilibrium industry output depends only on the sum of the unit
costs, and is independent of how this sum is split between …rms. To ensure
uniqueness andinteriority of the solution additional assumptions are imposed
below.
Given m, following Long and Soubeyran (2001), we de…ne the function
Ã(Q) = P
0(Q)Q +nP (Q), Ã(0) = nP (0) > nµmax.
Clearly, if Ã is a strictly decreasing function for all Q > 0 and if there exists
some Q# > 0 such that Ã(Q) < 0 for all Q greater than Q#, then (3) has
7a unique solution Q¤ = Q¤(µ) for each µ in the interval [nµmin;nµmax]. The
condition that Ã is strictly decreasing can be expressed as
"(Q) < n + 1 8Q. (4)
This is the usual stability condition for Cournot equilibria, see, for example,
Dixit (1986).
Assumption 2 There exists a positive Q# such that Ã(Q) < µmin for all
Q > Q# and for all Q ￿ Q#, the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve
is less than n +1.
Finally, the assumption that the equilibrium output q¤
j is positive for all
…rms is justi…ed if the following assumption is satis…ed.
Assumption 3 For all µ in the interval [nµmin;nµmax], µj < P (Q¤(µ)) for
all j.
Note that Assumptions 1 to 3 hold, for example, for P (Q) = Q¡("¡1)
with 1 < " < n +1.
We are now ready to state a few important results. From (1) and (4), we





(n +1 ¡ "(Q¤))P0 (Q¤)
< 0,
























. As a result, …rm
















where q¡j = (q1;::: ;qj¡1;qj+1;::: ;qn).
82.2 Analysis of Stage One : Non-collusive Manipula-
tions of R§D spillovers
We now describe the stage-one game.
To simplify the analysis, we focus in this section on the oligopoly case
where the inverse demand function is de…ned by P (Q) = Q¡("¡1) with 1 <
" < n + 1.
We assume that for j = 1;::: ;n
µj = ¹ µ ¡ rj , (6)
where rj is the reduction in unit cost due to …rm j’s R&D expenditure,
xj, and the spillovers it obtains from the other …rm’s expenditure, xk. The
magnitude of these spillovers depends on the share of codi…ed knowledge, dj,
of any …rm j: The latter in‡uences the spillovers in two ways; it increases the
information-sharing parameter of …rm j but it also increases its absorptive
capacity of others’ research discoveries. Formally,




rj = f (Xj),
where °0(dj) > 0; ¯0(dk) > 0;0 < ¯(dk) ￿ 1, 0 ￿ ° (dj) ￿ 1 andf0(Xj) > 0.
Following Cohen and Levinthal (1989), we may call Xj, …rm j’s stock of
technological and scienti…c knowledge7 and ° (dj) …rm j’s absorptive capa-
city. We may call ¯ (dk) the information-sharing function. Note that dk can
be interpreted as the percentage of its knowledge that the …rm chooses to
codify and reveal, while ¯(dk) is the e¤ective percentage revealed to its com-
petitors. The absorptive capacity, in turn, is the fraction of the knowledge
revealed by its competitor that the …rm is able to exploit.
Cohen and Levinthal assume that this capacity depends on the …rm’s
R&D expenditure. Here, the …rm’s R&D expenditure is exogenous and it is
assumed that xj = x for all j. The absorptive capacity is nevertheless endo-
genous and depends on the …rm’s share of codi…ed knowledge. To illustrate
this point let us come back to the example where the code is “writing pa-
tents”. The idea is that a …rm is more able to read a patent written by its
competitor as it becomes itself an expert in writing patents. Hence, ° (dj) is
an increasing function of dj:
For what regards the information-sharing parameter, in contrast to vir-
tually all the literature, we assume that ¯ is endogenous and is an increasing
7This term is refered as …rm j’s e¤ective R&D investment by Kamien et al. (1992).
9function of dk. Note that it includes the case where ¯ (dk) = dk. However,
this last case would correspond to a rather severe restriction, since it would
mean that the …rm has an absolute control on the information sharedwith its
competitors. Typically, it holds that ¯(dk) > dk for all dk ¸ 0; in particular,
¯ (0) > 0 : some knowledge transfers are beyond the control of the …rm8. The
magnitude of these involuntary spillovers depends on several factors such as
the amount of knowledge incorporated in a product, the technology of the
…rm and, in particular, all the factors related to industrial espionage, protec-
tion of intellectual rights. Clearly, as intellectual protection is more e¢cient,
¯ (0) gets closer to 0. Note that the model also allows for a situation where
¯ (dk) < dk : the amount of knowledge e¤ectively shared by the …rm is lo-
wer than the knowledge it is ready to reveal. Such a result is obtained if,
for example, part of the knowledge is tacit and cannot be transcribed on a
patent.
The equilibrium shares of codi…ed knowledge depend fundamentally on
the ratio of the elasticity of ¯ with respect to the elasticity of ° and on
the degree of concavity of the demand curve. These elasticities are respecti-
vely noted "¯(d) and "° (d): To simplify the analysis we focus on symmetric
equilibria, i.e. at the equilibrium one has dj = d¤ for all j.











¢2 ¡ cdjx = ¼¤
j (dj;d¡j):
We …rst study the non-collusive equilibrium where …rms choose indepen-
dently their shares of codi…ed knowledge in stage one.
At any symmetric equilibrium …rms choose a maximal share of codi…ed
knowledge d¤ = 1 if
@¼¤
j(d;:::;d)





















Conversely, at any symmetric equilibrium …rms choose a minimal share
8Note that when ¯ (0) = 0, at the second-stage equilibrium, …rms choose the lowest
codi…cation/information parameter.
10of codi…ed knowledge d¤ = 0 if
@¼¤
j(d;:::;d)


















In order to formulate the two above conditions in terms of the funda-
mentals we denote gmin = mind2[0;1]g (d) and gmax = maxd2[0;1]g (d), for any
function g from [0;1] into R:

























thenthere exists a unique symmetric stage-one equilibrium. At thisequi-






























thenthere exists a unique symmetric stage-one equilibrium. At thisequi-
librium, …rms choose a minimal share of codi…ed knowledge, i.e. d¤ = 0.
Point (i) establishes that, in contrast to Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998a,
1998b)9, the fact that …rms may choose to maximally reveal information
even in the absence of collusiondoes not rely onthe fact that …rms operate in
di¤erent industry and pursue complementary researchpaths but onthe weak
9As underline by Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998a, 1998b), when spillovers are endogenous
it is important to distinguish between substitute and complementary research paths and
between …rms being located in the same industry or in di¤erent industries. These authors
conclude that the only con…guration where …rms choose maximal spillover parameters in
the absence of cooperation is when …rms operate in di¤erent but complementary industries.
In particular, complementary research paths do not ensure on their own maximal spillover
parameters.Proposition 1 establishes that maximal spillover parameters might also emerge
when non-cooperative …rms operate in the same industry.
11concavity of the demand curve andon asu¢ciently highratioof theelasticity
of the absorptive capacity with respect to the elasticity of the information-
sharing function.10
The intuition behind this result is related to the speci…c type of co-
opetition introduced in our model and can be obtained by interpreting (8).
Initially, the …rm has an incentive tokeep its share of codi…ed knowledge low,
since …rms are rivals in the product market, an increase of the information-
sharing spillover parameter makes competition …ercer by decreasing the unit
cost of its competitors. However, when the …rm increases its share of codi…ed
knowledge it also develops its skills to read the code better, hence it increases
its absorptive capacity of others’ research discoveries and by the way its pro-
…t. The strength of these two marginal e¤ects depends on two factors. The
…rst one is the value of the rivalry e¤ect induced by a uniform decrease in
unit cost across …rms. The second one is the di¤erence between the marginal
decrease of the unit cost of the …rm and the marginal decrease of the unit
cost of any of its competitors.
To bring out the role of these two factors, let us assume …rst that the
increase of the share of codi…ed knowledge of …rm j generates a uniform
decrease in unit cost across …rms, i.e.
dµj
ddj = dµk
ddj for all k 6= j. In our model,
this is thecaseat any symmetric choice dofthe…rms if(n¡ 1)"° (d) = "¯ (d),









































0. Seade (1985) shows that in the case ofan oligopoly with identical …rms and





dµj < 0) provided that the demand curve is weakly
concave or convex, i.e. " < 2. In fact, this condition ensures that the equi-
librium price does not fall signi…cantly. At the symmetric equilibrium, this
10This result is obtained when …rms pursue complementary research paths. However,
when …rms operate in the same industry the same qualitative conclusions are obtained
whether …rms pursue complementary or substitute research paths, see Katsoulacos and
Ulph (1998b).
12allows to increase the pro…t of any …rm. Hence, if " < 2 , the rivalry e¤ect
is low and the uniform cost reduction has a positive impact on the pro…t of
any …rm (the …rst term in between the brackets in condition (8) is positive).
Independently of the cost of codi…cation, this e¤ect is the only one to
emerge as long as, as assumed in most of the literature (see for example
Long and Soubeyran (1998)), the increase of the spillover strategic variable
of one …rm generates a uniform decrease in unit cost across …rms. However,
in this paper, despite …rms are identical the increase of the share of codi-
…ed knowledge of one …rm generates an asymmetric decrease in unit cost
across …rms (as long as (n ¡ 1)"°(d) 6= "¯(d)). If (n ¡ 1)"° (d) > "¯(d)
the marginal decrease of the unit cost is stronger for the …rm than for any
of its competitor, hence the …rm bene…ts more than its competitors of the
cost reduction (the second term in between the brackets in condition (8) is
positive).
These two marginal e¤ects overcome the marginal cost of codi…cation if
the elasticity of the slope ofthe demand function is su¢ciently low(condition
10), and if the absorptive capacity of the …rm is relatively more sensitive
than its information-sharing function to a change in the share of codi…ed




Point (ii) allows to underline that a strong rivalry e¤ect, which emerges
when the demand curve is su¢ciently concave, might be su¢cient to give
…rms the incentive not to codify at all.
It is interesting to observe that if °(0) = 0 then, as long as the margi-
nal cost of codi…cation and information-sharing is not too high11, one has
@¼¤
j
@dj (0;::: ;0) > 0. In this case, …rms have the incentive to choose a strictly
positive share of codi…ed knowledge, i.e. d¤
j > 0 for all j: To be more explicit,
the …rm must codify and reveal this information to be able to absorb any
codi…ed and revealedknowledge of its competitors. These incentives to codify
and reveal knowledge are analogous to incentives to invest in R&D studied
by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) leading one …rm to invest in its own R&D to
be able to absorb any of the R&D output of its competitors. However, the
assumption that ° (0) = 0 would be quite severe in the sense that there are
R&D spillovers beyond the control of the …rm.
11Formally, this holds as long as
c < °








133 The Linear Demand Case
In order to outline that the set of economies ful…lling conditions (10) and
(11) is non negligible we focus on economies with a linear demand function.
This will also allowus to de…ne, in this case, the conditions for the emergence
of a symmetric interior stage-one equilibrium. Note that here the elasticity
of the slope of the demand function is null. Hence, a uniform cost reduction
induces a low rivalry e¤ect and therefore increases the pro…t of any …rm at
the symmetric equilibrium.
The inverse demand function is written
P (Q) = a ¡ bQ,
where a, b 2 R+ with a > (n + 1)µ
max ¡ µ
min12.







k=1µk ¡ (n + 1)µj
(n+ 1)b
. (13)








The …rm j’s equilibrium pro…t is
¼
¤














At stageone, theexistenceof asymmetric interiorequilibrium depends on
the relative magnitude of the elasticity of the absorptive capacity function
and of the elasticity of the information-sharing function as well as on the
degree of concavity of these two functions and on the degree of concavity
of the reduction cost function. This is formally stated in the subsequent
proposition where stage-one equilibrium is characterized. In this proposition
we make use of the following notation. For any function g, rg = ¡
g00
g0 is the




cf ￿ rf (d)
e¯° ￿ "° (d)[n"° (d)¡ "¯(d)]
c¯° ￿ n"° (d)r° (d) ¡ "¯(d)r¯ (d)
,
12This is a su¢cient condition for Assumptions 1 to 3 to hold.
13One easily checks that this equilibrium is stable since Dixit’s condition holds.
14where cf;e¯° and c¯° 2 R. Hence, cf is an indicator of the degree of concavity
of the reduction cost function. The parameter e¯° indicates how relatively
large is the elasticity of the capacity function and in particular howrelatively
large it is with respect to the elasticity of the information-sharing function.
Finally, c¯° indicates how relatively large is the product of the elasticity and
the degree ofconcavity of the capacity functionwithrespect to the product of
the elasticity and the degree ofconcavity of the information-sharing function.
Proposition 2 (i) If,








(n+1)2b , then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
At this equilibrium …rms choose to codify the maximum level of their know-
ledge, i.e. d¤ = 1:
(ii) If;
2(n ¡ 1)Amax [n°0
max¯(1) ¡ ¯
0





2b , then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
At this equilibrium …rms choose to codify the minimum level of their know-
ledge, i.e. d¤ = 0:
(iii) If
½
2(n ¡ 1)Amax[n°0(1)¯(1) ¡ ¯
0 (1)° (1)] < c





















, then there exists










(n ¡ 1)E < c¯°
, (20)
where E = maxd2(0;1)
"¯(d)"°(d)
d , then there exists a unique symmetric equili-
brium.
15Points (i) and(ii) are simply the application of Proposition 1 to the linear
demand case. They show that there exists a non negligible set of economies
where non-collusive …rms operating in the same industry do not choose the
lowest level for the spillover parameters. This is illustrated in the appendix
for a linear function f and concave functions ¯ and °.
Point (iii) demonstrates that under some restrictions …rms choose to co-
dify and reveal an intermediary level of their knowledge. For these interior
solutions to emerge at least one of the three parameters cf, e¯° and c¯° has
to be su¢ciently large. This means that either the reduction cost function is
su¢ciently concave, either the elasticity of the capacity function is very large
or signi…cant enough with respect to the elasticity of the information-sharing
function, or …nally the capacity function is relatively more concave than the
information-sharing function. Note, in particular, that when the three funda-
mental functions are linear (i.e. f0; ¯
0 and °0 areconstant) no interior solution
can emerge due to the convexity of the …rm pro…t function.
The proposition proves in addition that the interior solution is unique
when e¯° is non zero and cf and c¯° are su¢ciently large.
4 Welfare analysis
4.1 Collusive Manipulations of R§D spillovers
We shall start the welfare analysis with the study of production e¢ciency.
Inother words, we study the pure co-opetition game, whereinstage one …rms
choose cooperatively their shares of codi…ed knowledge in order to maximize
the industry pro…t while they remain rivals in stage two.
Note that equilibria of this co-opetition game might well be asymmetric.
E¤ectively, Long and Soubeyran (1997a, 1997b, 2001) show that there is an
e¢ciency motive for an asymmetric cost manipulation. The intuition behind
this result is as follows. In a Cournot oligopoly, with a …xed number of …rms
each having a constant marginal cost, the equilibrium industry output in
stage two depends only on the sum of their marginal costs (see Bergstorm
and Varian, 1985); it follows that if this sum is kept constant, while some
…rms’ marginal costs are made to increase and other …rms’ marginal costs
are made todecrease (increasing cost dispersion), then industry output, price
and total revenue will remain unchanged, and therefore industry pro…t (and
at the sametime social welfare) will rise because the same total output is now
produced at lower cost (as …rms with decreased marginal costs will expand
their market share at the expense of …rms with increased marginal costs).
Here, the improvement on allocative e¢ciency is no longer obtained through
16the heterogeneity of …rms’ unit cost of production but rather through the
internalization of the positive R§D spillovers.
















When the marginal cost of codi…cation/information-sharing is zero14, due
to the internalization of the positive R§D spillovers the industry pro…t is
maximized at any symmetric solution when …rms codify the maximum level
of their knowledge. One can easily check that
@¼¤
I(d;:::;d)
@dj > 0 for all d 2 [0;1]
(see equation(30) in the appendix). This remains true as longas themarginal
cost c is not too large.
Proposition 3 (i) If




then, there existsa unique symmetric solution maximizing industry pro-
…t, dj = 1 for all j.
(ii) At any symmetric non-collusive equilibrium, with 0 < d¤ < 1, where d¤












Note that condition (22) might hold simultaneously with any of the three
conditions (16), (17), or (18) and (19). This means that, under (22), industry
pro…t is maximized when …rms codify all their knowledge while they might
not have chosen to do so at the symmetric non-collusive equilibrium.
Undertheadditional assumptionthat¼¤
I isconcavewithrespect to(dj;d¡j),
point (ii) implies that even if the solution of the pure co-opetition game is
not dj = 1 for all j, …rms choose to codify more than at the non-collusive
symmetric equilibrium. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that this
14In that case the “cost of manipulating costs” (see Long and Soubeyran, 2001) is zero.
17result is only valid under the conditions ensuring the existence of interior
symmetric solutions.
In particular, without collusion the existence of an interior symmetric
equilibrium requires the conditions established in Proposition 2 (iii), na-
mely the concavity requirements of the cost reduction function and the as-
sumptions on the shape of the absorptive capacity and of the information-
sharing function, which generate a concave pro…t function for any …rm. Note
that the pro…t function could still be convex if the function of codi…ca-
tion/informationcostwere su¢ciently concave(rather than linearas assumed
in this paper).
In addition, a su¢cient condition for the existence of asymmetric interior
solution ofthe pure co-opetion gamerequires theconcavity of ¼¤
I with respect
to (dj;d¡j) which is not ensured by the concavity of ¼¤
j with respect to dj.
As underlined by Amir (2000), this possible failure of joint concavity of the
total payo¤ in the strategic variable of all …rms, in spite of the concavity
of each payo¤ in own decision, plays a crucial role in the emergence of an
asymmetric solution of the co-opetition game. This was also demonstrated by
Long and Soubeyran (2001). These authors consider a two-stage game where
rival …rms in the …nal good market manipulate cooperatively their marginal
costs instage one. They prove that whenthe industry pro…t is strictly convex
in the strategic variable of all …rms the reduction of the sum of unit costs
is achieved by only one …rm. When applied to our model this implies that
only one …rm choose to codify its knowledge at the equilibrium of the pure
co-opetion game.
Hence, whether collusion in stage one induces …rms to increase their share
of codi…ed knowledge crucially depends on the assumptions made on …rms’
technology. The possible reversion of this qualitative result with the speci…-
cation of …rms’ technologies is demonstrated in Section5 when collusion is
restricted to semi-collusion.
4.2 Social welfare
Next, consider social welfare, de…ned as the sum of consumers’ surplus




























From (25) and Proposition 3, we obtain the following result :




((n ¡ 1)(n(n ¡ 1) + 2)¯ (0)°0
min + 2(2n ¡ 1)°(0)¯0
min),
(26)
then, there exists a unique symmetric solution maximizing social wel-
fare, dj = 1 for all j.
(ii) At any symmetric non collusive equilibrium, with 0 < d¤ < 1, where d¤




Note that (26) is less restrictive than (22). This is clearly obtained since
the reduction of the sum of unit costs allows to increase the industry output
and by the way the consumers’ surplus. Hence the symmetric solution where
…rms codify all their knowledge is obtained for a larger set of economies
when social welfare (rather than industry pro…t) is maximized. In addition,
whatever the cost of codi…cation/information-sharing, at the non-collusive
symmetric equilibrium, it is always socially optimal that …rms increase their
share of codi…ed knowledge. This result implies that the social optimum is
obtained for higher shares of codi…ed knowledge under the additional as-
sumption that W is concave with respect to (dj;d¡j):
This result gives a justi…cation to a technology policy that takes the
form of subsidies to information-sharing research joint ventures – a type
of policy that is particularly common in the European Commission. This
subsidy might be a reduction in social charges, a simpli…cation of the licence
process, a subsidy to the organization of industrial exhibitions or scienti…c
conferences and so on.
It is also interesting to observe that we get the traditional result that,
as the number of …rms increases, the non-collusive equilibrium gets closer to
the social optimum. This is obtained, since as the number of …rms increases,
the rivalry e¤ect is lower, hence …rms’ incentive to codify their knowledge
increases. E¤ectively, by derivating equation (29), one gets dd¤
dn > 0.
195 Collusive Manipulations of R§D spillovers
within a subset of …rms
We now consider a model where a subset of …rms cooperate in the choice
of the spillover variables. This cooperation takes the form of an increase in
the spillover coe¢cients and a cooperative choice of the shares of codi…ed
knowledge. This formalization allows us to distinguish between cooperation
and maximal information-sharing/absorptive capacity. To simplify the ana-
lysis we consider a model with only three …rms. More speci…cally, suppose
that …rm 1 and …rm 2 collude. Then, the stocks of technological and scienti…c
knowledge of the two …rms become
½
X1 = x+ ±°(d1)¯ (d2)x+ ° (d1)¯(d3)x
X2 = x+ ±°(d2)¯ (d1)x+ ° (d2)¯(d3)x
;
where ± > 1: The stock of technological and scienti…c knowledge of …rm 3 is
still given by equation (7).15
Again, in stage one, …rms choose their share of codi…ed knowledge and,
in stage-two, they compete in quantities. Equations (1) to (5) remain valid
descriptions of the equilibrium in stage two. In stage one, we assume that
…rm 1 and …rm 2 consider …rm 3’s share of codi…ed knowledge as given and
collusively choose their shares of codi…ed knowledge to maximize the sum of
their stage-two Cournot equilibrium pro…ts. This formulation is in the tradi-
tion of the theory of semi-collusion (as exempli…ed by the work of Friedman
and Thisse, 1993, Fershtman and Gandal, 1994, Long and Soubeyran, 1998,
and others).
Tosimplify the analysis we focus in a …rst step ona linear function of cost
reduction, i.e. f (X) = X, this assumption is relaxed later on. We assume,
in addition that c = 0. In this case, collusion gives …rms the incentive to
choose maximal information-sharing/absorptive capacity. This is due to the
fact that collusive …rms internalize the positive spillovers. Firm 3 might also
increase its share of codi…ed knowledge in order to be able to absorb its
competitors’ knowledge. This is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (i) If there exists a symmetric semi-collusive equilibrium,
it is necessarily (1;1;1); the three …rms choose the maximum share of
codi…ed knowledge.
(ii) Let us assume that "¯(1) ￿ 3"°(1), then (1;1;1) is a semi-collusive
equilibrium.
15Hence, …rms are now ex-ante asymmetric.









¯0(0) and if ° is more concave than





is a semi-collusive equi-
librium, where 0 < dSC
3 < 1 and d¤ < dSC
3 (d¤ > dSC
3 ) if "° (d) < "¯(d)
("° (d) < "¯(d))for all d 2 [0;1], dSC
3 is the share of codi…ed knowledge
chosen by …rm 3, and d¤ denotes the share of codi…ed knowledge at the
non-collusive symmetric equilibrium.
Let us compare these results with the ones of Proposition 2. In the case
where non-collusive …rms choose the maximum share of codi…ed knowledge
(condition (16) holds, more precisely one has "¯(1) ￿ 3"° (1)), the introduc-
tion of semi-collusion doesn’t a¤ect the …rms’ equilibrium choice. In the case
where non-collusive …rms choose the minimum or an intermediary level of
their share of codi…ed knowledge (points (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 2, where
it holds that 3"° (1) < "¯(1)), the introduction of semi-collusion gives …rm 1
and …rm 2 the incentive to choose the maximum share of codi…ed knowledge.
Whether …rm 3 increases its share of codi…ed knowledge, with the introduc-
tion of semi-collusion depends on the shape of the absorptive capacity and of
the information-sharing function. Note that the emergence of an asymmetric
solution is sensitive to the di¤erence between the degree of concavity of these
two functions.
However, whether semi-collusion induces the collusive …rms to increase
their share of codi…ed knowledge, depend crucially on the speci…cation of the
relationship between the stock of technological and scienti…c knowledge and
the induced reduction of production cost. For a su¢ciently concave function
of cost reduction, f, we prove below that the result is opposite.
Proposition 6 (i) Consider a function f1; such that f10(X) > 0 for all
X. Assume that at the non-collusive equilibrium …rm 1 and …rm 2 choose
to codify all their knowledge. Furthermore, assume that under semi-collusion
they choose to reduce their share of codi…ed knowledge. Then, this reduction
of the shares of codi…ed knowledge under semi-collusion is obtained for any
function of cost reduction, f2; which is a concavi…cation of f1; i.e. for any
function f2 such that f2 = g ± f1 where g0 > 0 and g00 < 0:
(ii) Consider the function f1(X) = ln(1 +X): Assume that at the non-
collusive equilibrium …rm 1 and …rm 2 choose to codify all their knowledge.
Then, at the semi-collusive equilibrium they choose to reduce their shares of
codi…ed knowledge.
216 Conclusions
In this paper the qualitative results of the welfare analysis were conditio-
nal on assumptions ensuring the emergence of symmetric solutions, asymme-
tric solutions have only be considered in the case of semi-collusion in stage
one with ex-ante asymmetry. One natural extension is, therefore, the study
of a broader class of …rms technologies in order to study the emergence of
asymmetric solutions of the pure co-opetition game when …rms are ex-ante
identical. E¤ectively, Long and Soubeyran (1997a, 1997b, 2001), Amir and
Wooders (1999) and Amir, Evstigneev and Wooders (2003), show that equi-
libria of such a co-opetition game might well be asymmetric. The intuition
behind this result is as follows. In a Cournot oligopoly, with a …xed number of
…rms each having a constant marginal cost, the equilibrium industry output
in stage two depends only on the sum of their marginal costs (see Bergstorm
and Varian, 1985); it follows that if this sum is kept constant, while some
…rms’ marginal costs are made to decrease (increasing cost dispersion), then
industry output, price and total revenue will remain unchanged, and there-
fore industry pro…t (and at the same time social welfare) will rise because
the same total output is now produced at lower cost (as …rms with decrea-
sed marginal costs will expand their market share at the expense of …rms
with increased marginal costs). This is a second e¢ciency motive for cost
manipulation.
In addition, even when the equilibrium of the non-collusive game is sym-
metric the equilibrium of the co-opetition game might well be asymmetric.
This is due to the possible failure of joint concavity of the total payo¤ in
the strategic variable of all …rms, in spite of the concavity of each payo¤ in
own decision. This phenomenon can give an account of the reversion of the
qualitative results with the speci…cation of …rms’ technologies obtained in a
co-opetition game. Such an explanation has been o¤ered by Amir (2000), in
a two-stage Cournot oligopoly with R§D investment decisions in stage one,
to the reversion of the qualitative results obtained in the co-opetition game
by considering weakly decreasing returns to scale in the R§D technology
rather than strongly decreasing ones. More generally, welfare results are of-
ten sensitive to the speci…cation of …rms’ technologies. This dependence has
been exempli…ed by Stahn (1998), who demonstrates that the introduction
of production costs reverses the welfare bene…ts of standardization.
227 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We shall …rstestablishconditions (8) and(9). Let us determinetheimpact
of a variation of the production cost on stage-two equilibrium. For all j and












































Let us nowdetermine the impact of variations of the share of codi…ed know-
ledge on production costs. From (6) and (7), we deduce that
(
dµj




ddj = ¡xf0(Xk)° (dk)¯
0(dj)
: (27)
























where Xj = X et q¤
j = q¤ for all j. On can easily check that the above
expression is strictly positive for all d 2 [0;1] under (8) and that it is strictly
negative for all d 2 [0;1] under (9).
Trivial computations show that (8) holds under (10) and (11), and (9)
holds under (12).
237.2 Proof of Proposition 2






























0(d)° (d)] ¡ cx, (28)
where q¤
j = q¤ and Xj = X¤ for all j.
One easily checks that
@¼¤
j




@dj (d;::: ;d) < 0 for all d 2 [0;1] under condition (17). Points (i)
and (ii) follow.
It remains to prove point (iii). Note that, in the stage-one game, the
set of possible strategies of any player is [0;1]. Furthermore, function ¼¤
j is
continuous in (d1;::: ;dn): Therefore, if ¼¤
j is quasi-concave in dj for any
(d1;::: ;dn) such that dj = d for all j, the traditional su¢cient conditions
for the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium hold. Note that the qua-
siconcavity requirement holds if for any (d1;d2;::: ;dn) such that dj = d,
d 2 [0;1] and
@¼¤
j
@dj (d;d;::: ;d) = 0, one has
@2¼¤
j




















2(n ¡ 1)x+ nf0(X)°00(d)¯ (d)













0(d)¯(d) ¡ ° (d)¯
0 (d)) = c:
(29)
24Thus, for any d 2 [0;1] with
@¼¤
j











f00(X)x(n ¡ 1)¯(d)°0 (d)(n¯(d)°0 (d)¡ ¯
0(d)° (d))















[x(n ¡ 1)rf(d)"°(d)(n"° (d) ¡ "¯(d)) + n"° (d)r° (d)¡ "¯(d)r¯(d)]




2 (d;::: ;d) ￿ 0 for all d 2 [0;1] and by the
way the existence of an interior symmetric equilibrium d¤, with 0 < d¤ < 1,
characterized by (29). In addition, this symmetric equilibrium is unique if
the right hand term of equation (29) is monotone in d. This property holds






















is of the same sign for any d 2 (0;1). This is true under condition (20).
8 Illustration of Proposition 2
Let us focus onthe subclass ofeconomies wherethe unitary cost reduction
induced by the investment in R§D is constant, i.e. f (X) = ÁX where Á > 0,
and the functions ¯ and ° are de…ned by
½
¯ (d) = ¯0 +¯1d ¡ ¯2d2
° (d) = °0 +°1d¡ °2d2 ,
with
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 < ¯0 ￿ 1
0 ￿ 2¯2 ￿ ¯1
0 ￿ ¯0 + ¯1¡ ¯2 ￿ 1
0 ￿ °0 ￿ 1
0 ￿ 2°2 ￿ °1
0 ￿ °0 +°1 ¡ °2 ￿ 1
:
25This implies, in particular, that the two functions ¯ and ° are concave (the
positive impact of codi…cation is achieved at a decreasing rate).





a¡ ¹ µ + Áx(1+ (n ¡ 1)¯0°0)
¤
< (¯1 ¡ 2¯0n)°2+ (n¯0 ¡ ¯1)°1¡ ¯1°0.









One easily checks that there exists a non negligible subset of economies ful-
…lling these conditions. This is true, for example, for all economies in the
neighborhood of an economy with ¯0 = 1
4, ¯1 = 1
2, ¯2 = 1
4, °0 = 1
4, °1 = 1,
°2 = 1











Using the same line of argument, one shows that there exists a non ne-
gligible subset of economies ful…lling condition (17).
8.1 Proof of Proposition 3

























@dk = (n ¡ 1)
2q¤xf0(X¤)
(n+1) (2° (d)¯









(¯ (d)°0(d) + ¯
0 (d)°(d)) ¡ cx. (30)
Therefore, as long as condition (22) holds, one has
@¼¤
I(d;:::;d)
@dj > 0 for all
d 2 [0;1]. This proves point (i).
For d = d¤, where d¤ satis…es (29), one has
@¼¤
I(d¤;:::;d¤)
@dj > 0 under (23),
point (ii) follows.
268.2 Proof of Proposition 4
























Trivial computations allow then to deduce point (i) and point (ii).
8.3 Proof of Proposition 5






























[2°0 (dc)(±¯(dc)+ ¯(d3))+ 2¯
0(dc)(±° (dc) ¡ ° (d3))].









[2(± + 1)°0 (d)¯(d) +2(± ¡ 1)¯
0(d)° (d)] > 0,
for all d. This implies that at the symmetric equilibrium the two cooperative
…rms choose the maximum share of codi…ed knowledge.
(ii) From point (i), it is obvious that …rm 1 and …rm 2 do not have any
incentive to deviate from (dc;dc;d3) = (1;1;1). It remains to check that this























@d3 (1;1;1) ¸ 0 if 3°0(1)¯(1) ¡ ° (1)¯
0(1) ¸ 0 , 3"°(1) ¸ "¯(1).





, with 0 ￿ dSC
3 < 1, is an equilibrium. In















































> 0 for 0 ￿ dSC
3 ￿ 1.





¯(1) then …rm 3 does not have any incentive to deviate from










¯(1) …rm 3 might choose an intermediary share of codi…ed know-
ledge dSC
3 with 0 < dSC
3 < 1 when the two cooperative …rms choose the maxi-






is ensured by the quasi-concavity of ¼¤
3(1;1;d3)
with respect to d3. Let us check this property. More precisely, we check that
for any d3 2 [0;1] with
@¼¤
3
@d3 (1;1;d3) = 0, one has
@2¼¤
3
(@d3)2 (1;1;d3) ￿ 0. For any




(1;1;d3) = 0 , 3°
0 (d3)¯(1) ¡ °(1)¯





2 (1;1;d3) = q
¤
3x[3°
00 (d3)¯(1) ¡ °(1)¯
00 (d3)].
Thus, for any d3 with
@¼¤
3














28This last expression is non positive as long as r°(d) > r¯(d) for all d. This
allows us to deduce that …rm 3’s choice is characterized by the …rst-order













for 1 > dSC

















¯(1) is continuous in d3: Hence, we deduce from 35
andthe theorem of intermediary values that there exists dSC
3 , with 1 > dSC
3 >
0; solution of (34).





decreasing under the assumption that r¯(d) < r°(d) for all d 2 [0;1]: We
compare now dSC





¯(d¤). Furthermore, under the assumption that "° (d) < "¯(d)
for all d 2 [0;1], the function
°(d)




















Therefore d¤ < dSC
3 , since the function
°0(d)
¯0(d) is decreasing in d. Clearly, dSC
3 <
d¤ if now "¯(d) < "° (d) for all d 2 [0;1]:
8.4 Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Assume that "¯(d) < 3"° (d) for all d. From proposition 2, we deduce
that at the symmetric equilibrium the non-cooperative …rms choose d¤ = 1.







0(1)° (1) < 0. (36)
From (31) and (36), we deduce that, when the function of cost reduction is
f1, …rm 1 and …rm 2 choose at the semi-collusive equilibrium to reduce the
29degree of their shares of codi…ed knowledge. Consider now that the function






























Hence, for the functionofcost reductionf2, …rm 1and…rm2 choose toreduce
their shares of codi…ed knowledge under semi-collusion.
(ii) Suppose that f1(X) = ln(1 + X). Let us prove that there exist some
values of the model parameters suchthat condition (36) holds. Note that this







[¯(1)° (1)(± ¡ 1)(± ¡ 2)x ¡ 2(± ¡ 1)(1+ x)]
2(± + 1)(1 +x +2x¯(1)° (1))
. (39)














¯ (1)° (1)(± ¡ 1)(± ¡ 2)x¡ 2(± ¡ 1)(1+ x)
2(± + 1)(1 +x + 2x¯ (1)° (1))
, 4(2± ¡ 1)(1+ x) < ¯(1)°(1)x(± ¡±1)(± ¡ ±2), (41)
where ±1 and ±2 are the roots of the polynomial 3±
2 ¡ 13± + 2. One easily
checks that ±1 < 1 and ±2 > 1. For ±2 < ±, a necessary condition for (41) is
h(±) =
4(2± ¡ 1)(1+ x)
x(± ¡±1)(± ¡ ±2)
< 1
, 4(2± ¡ 1) < 3x
¡
±
2 ¡ 7± + 2
¢





± ¡ ~ ±1
´³
± ¡ ~ ±2
´ < x, (42)
where ~ ±1 and ~ ±2, with ~ ±1 < ~ ±2, are the roots of the polynomial ±
2 ¡ 7± + 2.
Note that lim±¡!+1h(±) = 0 and lim±¡!+1k(±) = 0. Therefore, one can
…nd ± > ~ ±2 su¢ciently high to ensure (41) and (42). To conclude, one can ±




~ ±2 < ±
4(2±¡1)
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